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Does Financial Crisis Affect Good and Bad News 
Disclosure?  
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of financial crisis on 
financial reporting of good news and bad news in the UK annual report 
narrative sections. We use the manual content analysis to measure levels of 
good news and bad news information for a sample of 110 chairman 
statements of financial institutions. Our sample covers a five year period 
(2006–2010), which represents the global financial crisis year (2008), two 
years before the crisis and two years after the crisis. Our regression analysis 
shows that UK financial companies disclose more good news information 
than bad news information. We also find that the crisis affects the financial 
reporting of good news and bad news. These results suggest that after 
controlling for other firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms, UK financial companies disclose more bad news information 
during and after the crisis period, while they disclose less good news during 
these periods. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, hereafter abbreviated to (the crisis), is 
argued to have an impact on global economy that could be worse than the 
Great Depression of the 1930s (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009). The 
crisis that started in the USA resulted in the collapse of large financial 
institutions such as Lehman Brothers. The failures in these institutions led 
to freezing in global credit markets (Erkens et al., 2012). Governments 
around the world were forced to have rescue packages for bailing out 
financial systems, especially for sectors that are affected directly by the 
crisis; such as: banks, financial services, insurance companies and real 
estate investment trusts (REIT). 
 
In October 2008, the British government announced a bank rescue package 
on loans and guarantees totalling £500 billion, because of the implications 
of the crisis (Erkens et al., 2012). Northern Rock’s failure was evidence that 
British banks were also affected by the crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009). The crisis 
also affected stock markets in the UK, Swaine (2008) contended that the 
FTSE index experienced two falls in 29th September and 8th October 2008, 
that were considered amongst the worst FTSE falls in history. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Additionally, the crisis resulted in losing thousands of jobs and led to a 
credit squeeze in the UK. It has also had an impact on the UK’s industries 
and services, which was estimated to be highly damaging (House of 
Commons, 2009). 
 
In a recent paper, Keusch et al. (2012, p.623) found that “a crisis situation 
leads to more extensive use of self-serving bias as adverse external 
economic conditions are used by managers to present themselves in the best 
possible light”. This motivates us to examine the impact of financial crisis 
on the tone of narrative disclosure in the UK context. Our paper investigates 
the financial reporting of good news and bad news (hereafter, abbreviated 
to (good/bad news)) in chairman statements during, pre and after the crisis. 
We investigate the influence of the crisis on the levels of good/bad news 
information. We choose these statements because they considered as the 
most important sources of information for professional users (Bartlett and 
Chandler, 1997). These statements are also extensively used by investors 
(Smith and Taffler, 2000), and influence their decisions because these 
statements have a higher degree of readability (Clatworthy and Jones, 
2006). 
 
To date, the chairman statement in the UK context is a voluntary section of 
the annual report narratives which is “…unaudited and firms can lie, 
credibility becomes an issue” [Gigler, (1994), p.225]. Therefore, “…the 
chairman statement is subject to impression management techniques…” 
[Clatworthy and Jones, (2006), p.493].  
 
Using a sample of 110 UK chairman statements for the period 2006 – 2010, 
we contribute to existing disclosure studies by providing evidence that bad 
news disclosure is positively associated with the crisis suggesting that risky 
and poor performing financial institutions provided a more negative tone 
during the crisis. In addition, we find that managers attribute their bad news 
information to the crisis. Meanwhile, we find that good news information is 
inversely associated with the crisis. Good news disclosure findings suggest 
that managers are not using chairman statements to communicate good 
news information. They might prefer to use a more timely communication 
channel such as interim reports, press release, conference calls or internet 
reporting. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 3 presents the research design. Section 4 
presents the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Chairman statements are considered amongst the most important 
information sources for financial reports users and also the most read 
section in the annual report (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997). These statements 
have prime positions within annual reports (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). 
Based on Arthur Andersen 2001; Beynon et al. (2004) argued that, the 
chairman statement is considered as one of the most popular forms of 
narrative disclosure. The importance of narratives disclosure in financial 
reports is increasing, as a 57% of 100 UK companies' annual report is 
devoted to accounting narratives comparing to 45% only in 1996. 
 
There are always incentives for managers to disclose information in 
chairman statements. Clatworthy and Jones (2006) studied the influence of 
financial performance on chairman statement narratives, particularly 
whether the financial performance affects companies' strategies disclosure. 
Their paper studied a sample of 100 chairman statements of profitable and 
unprofitable UK listed companies. They found that companies' financial 
performance affects the content of chairman statements as these statements 
are subject to impression management techniques. They also found that 
chairman statements focus on the future performance rather than past 
performance when companies are not profitable. Hence, studying the 
impact of the crisis on the content of chairman statements might be 
interesting, because of the popularity of these statements for users. 
 
Impression management literature focuses on financial graphs, photographs 
and accounting narratives in annual reports. Companies use impression 
management to attractively present their performance, especially when their 
performance is bad. However, there is a threat that impression management 
lead to not producing neutral and unbiased annual reports. 'Recent corporate 
collapses in the US (such as Enron and WorldCom), which were a 
combination of fraud (e.g. Rosner, 2003) and impression management (e.g. 
Davidson et al., 2004) illustrate this point' (Clatworthy and Jones, 
2006:494). 
 
Prior research examined the motives of chairmen and the usefulness of the 
information disclosed in chairman statements. Clatworthy and Jones 
(2003:183) found that '…Management therefore uses the chairman 
statement to place a positive emphasis on financial performance and 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
attempts to deflect attention away from their responsibility for poor 
financial results'. As chairman statements are unaudited, but auditors only 
insure the consistency with financial results, therefore 'this issue is worthy 
of future regulatory attention' (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003:183). They also 
examined the effects of companies' performance on the good/bad news 
disclosure in chairman statements. They found that companies prefer to 
emphasize positive performance by accounting narratives disclosure, as 
companies want to benefit from good news disclosure, while blaming the 
outside environment in bad news narratives.  
 
Clarke (1993) analysed accounting narratives in chairman statements of 32 
investment companies, and found clear inferences between chairman 
statements and the investment companies' mission. Schleicher and Walker 
(2010) measured the tone of forward- looking narratives by manually 
reading the narratives in the outlook section, the 'meaning-orientated' 
content analysis approach. They found that the larger impending 
performance the more decline that bias the tone in the outlook section. In 
addition, firms' forecast tone are more positive when firms make loss or 
more risky. Meanwhile, firms forecast are more negative when earnings 
decline. Smith and Taffler (2000) used both 'form oriented' objective 
analysis and 'meaning oriented' subjective analysis, for evaluating the 
statistical models based on words and themes stated in chairman statements, 
to explain company's failure. They found an association between the form 
and the contents of future forecast narratives that disclosed by 
managements. 
 
The crisis had a gloomy and global impact on markets, which could be 
worse than the 1930s Great Depression (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009). 
The crisis is originated in the United States US )Adams, 2012(. The US 
financial markets used to be taken as a model in terms of: well-organized, 
regulated, good governance and investor protection. It resulted in dramatic 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, in addition to many US financial institutions 
(Adams, 2012). Therefore, the US government rescue programme bailed 
out many institutions during the crisis. Hence, the crisis might influence the 
content of tone disclosure in chairman statements of affected institutions. 
 
By mid-2008 the crisis was associated by liquidity squeeze (Kirkpatrick, 
2009), and had an impact on financial institutions, especially banks, in both 
the US and Europe, in addition to many other countries (Tandrayen-
Ragoobur, 2011). Kirkpatrick (2009) argued that the failure of financial 
institutions during the crisis could be attributed to the weaknesses and 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
failures of corporate governance system. The crisis surprised many parties 
including governments and markets. Adams (2012) argued that the crisis 
was predicted by few people only, both internal and professional parties 
such as firms' boards, academics, regulators, financial analysts and financial 
firms' directors failed in predicting the crisis. Therefore, the crisis could 
have an impact on good/bad news disclosure in chairman statements of 
many financial institutions. 
 
Financial markets in the United Kingdom (UK) score high in terms and 
measures of investor's protection, and could be taken as a model (Adams, 
2012). But a £500 billion bank rescue package was announced in loans and 
guarantees by British government in October 2008, because of the 
consequences of the crisis (Erkens et al., 2012). Northern Rock ended up 
becoming nationalised, even though the directors' of Northern Rock 
acknowledged reading the UK’s FSA warnings in early 2007 about liquidity 
risk (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
 
The FTSE 100 index had a dramatic fall during the crisis. Adair et al. (2009) 
stated that '…in the UK the benchmark FTSE 100 index recorded the worst 
performance since its launch 24 years ago, closing at 4,434.17, down 
31.3%...'. The House of Commons report (2009) provided examples for a 
dramatic falls in the market capitalization: In April 2007, £316.9 billion was 
the capitalisation amount of the listed nine banks. By 7th April 2008, £245.1 
billion only became the market capitalisation of the only listed seven banks, 
as Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock had dropped out the FTSE 100 
index as a consequence of the crisis. After that in 6th April 2009, the value 
of the five remaining listed banks under the FTSE 100 banking sector 
became £138.1 billion only. Therefore, The FTSE 100 index might be 
appropriate for the current research as the crisis affected the index and many 
listed financial institutions. 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argued that the crisis unfortunately would not 
be the last financial crisis. They also argued that as financial crises strike 
markets very often and there are remarkable similarities with past 
experience from history and from other countries. Studying the impact of 
the crises on good and bad news disclosure might be an interesting research 
topic. Our paper contributes to existing disclosure literature by examining 
the impact of the crisis on the good and bad news disclosure in chairman 
statements. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Prior literature showed that loss making and risky firms disclose a positive 
tone when earnings increase, while they disclose a negative tone with 
earnings decline (Schleicher and Walker, 2010). In addition, the literature 
showed that companies prefer to use bad news disclosure to blame the 
external environment, meanwhile emphasise their positive performance by 
good news disclosure (Clatworthy & Jones, 2003). The crisis could be 
considered as an instance of an extraordinary environment that carried 
gloomy expectations to financial markets as per the House of Commons 
report (2009). 
 
Therefore, the crisis that had a gloomy impact on financial markets might 
affect the disclosure of good news/bad news information in chairman 
statements. The current research treats this investigation as a purely 
empirical question and offers no prior theoretical predictions as to degree to 
which the crisis affects the disclosure of good/bad news information. 
Therefore, our main research hypothesis is:  
 
There is an association between financial crisis and the publication of 
good/bad news information in chairman statement of UK companies. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample Selection 
We focus on a sample of UK listed financial institutions. We choose FTSE 
100 index since the highest market capitalization companies are listed under 
this group. Erkens et al., (2012:389) stated that 'an unprecedented large 
number of financial institutions collapsed or were bailed out by 
governments during the global financial crisis'. The banking sector market 
capitalization in the UK experienced dramatic collapse to become 245.1 
billion sterling pounds on 6 April 2008, falling from 316.9 billion sterling 
pounds on 2 April 2007 (House of Commons, 2009).  The number of listed 
banks also decreased as well as two listed banks, Bradford & Bingley and 
Northern Rock, dropped out of the index (House of Commons, 2009). 
Kirkpatrick (2009:4) stated that 'in the UK, there had been a run on Northern 
Rock, the first in 150 years, ending in the bank being nationalised'. Financial 
services sector also had difficulties as 'thousands of jobs in the financial 
services sector have been lost. The full implications of the credit squeeze 
on the UK’s industries and services remains unclear but its impact is likely 
to be highly damaging' (House of Commons report, 2009:7). The crisis also 
affected real estate investment trust (REIT) listed companies, by affecting 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
their investments in both the UK commercial property market and the US 
real estate residential market. Finally, the investments of the insurance listed 
companies were affected by the crisis too.  
 
Based on the above, we choose the following financial sectors: banks (IT1), 
financial services (IT2), life insurance (IT3), non-life insurance (IT4) and 
real estate investment trust (IT5). We collect a sample of 110 chairman 
statements to test our research hypothesis for years 2006-2010; the sample 
included almost all the firms' chairman statements that listed under these 
industry sectors. The sample period covers five years. We choose the year 
of the crisis (2008) and two years before and after the crisis. 
 
Finally, the explanatory and control variables data is collected from 
Thomson One Banker database, while annual reports were downloaded 
from the companies' websites. The London Stock Exchange website also 
provided relevant data, such as: industry classifications, companies' 
websites addresses and fundamental information. 
 
Research Variables and the Model 
This paper uses the content analysis approach to identify good/bad news 
disclosure in chairman statement. We identify the number of good news 
statements, the number of bad news statements and then we calculate the 
percentage of bad news to good news information. We use these variables 
as dependent variables in our regression model. 
 
The crisis gloomy impacts on financial markets might be relevant to this 
research. The crisis is considered as an instance of an extraordinary 
environment that carried miserable expectations to financial markets 
(House of Commons report, 2009). During extraordinary environment, 
companies prefer to use bad news disclosure to blame the external 
environment (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). We consider, therefore, crisis 
as the main explanatory variable. 
 
We consider a number of control variables. We control for firm size. Kang 
and Gray (2011:406) argue that 'firm size is perhaps the most consistent 
corporate-specific characteristic found to be positively associated with the 
level of voluntary disclosure'. There are several reasons for that positive 
relationship (Hassan et al., 2006). Large listed financial institutions are 
required to avoid any agency conflicts by voluntary disclosure (Barako et 
al., 2006). Therefore in accordance with agency theory, large firms should 
disclose more information. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
Another control variable is profitability. Prior research found that firms' 
profitability affects disclosure. Agency theory suggested that managers of 
profitable companies disclose more information to magnify their success 
and to increase investors' confidence in company's management. In 
addition, managers might desire to promote positive impressions using 
management impression techniques to attract many parties such as potential 
lenders and investors. However, management might disclose less 
information because of loss or lower profitability, as managers wish to 
vague such poor performance results (Kun Wang et al., 2008). 
 
We also control for leverage. Leverage is also considered as an incentive 
for companies to disclose more information as this reduces agency costs 
(Kang and Gray, 2011). Agency theory suggested that leveraged companies 
reduce these agency costs by increasing their disclosure, which might 
satisfy creditors and might reduce the agency conflicts (Barako et al., 2006). 
 
Growth is another incentive for companies to disclose more information to 
reduce the gap between companies' market value and book value (Kang and 
Gray, 2011). Therefore, we control for growth opportunity in our model. 
 
We control for dividends and audit quality. Companies' managers that 
distributed dividends during the crisis supposed to emphasize their 
performance, liquidity and their managerial abilities to perform well. 
During the crisis time, firms might not be able to pay dividends for 
shareholders, and then they might use alternative mechanisms to inform 
their shareholders about their future prospects. One of these mechanisms is 
the increase in the level of voluntary disclosure as suggested by signalling 
theory (Hussainey and Aal-Eisa, 2009). Based on the agency theory, 
auditors may play a role in improving companies' strategies of financial 
reporting and in reducing the agency problem. Kun Wang et al. (2008:18) 
stated that '…the choice of an external auditor can serve as a signal of firm 
value'.  
 
During the crisis, it seems that corporate governance mechanisms did not 
sufficiently play the safeguard role against risk. Therefore, risk 
management systems failed in many financial services institutions 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). Since the board approved strategies, it is the board 
responsibility to monitor implementation and the consequences. The crisis 
can be attributed to weaknesses and failures in corporate governance 
according to Kirkpatrick (2009). The agency theory recommends some 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
incentives for disclosure (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008), including: Board 
size. Based on stakeholder theory, board composition is one of the 
determinants of disclosure. Empirical research shows that non-executive 
independent directors advance the board’s capacity to improve agency 
conflict. Since, they play a reliable governance mechanism that would raise 
the voluntary disclosure in companies' annual reports (Erkens et al., 2012). 
 
Finally, following prior research (Wang and Hussainey, 2013 and 
Elshandidy et al, 2013), we control for industry type in our regression 
models. 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of our control variables. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
Content Analysis:  
We use the manual content analysis approach to identify both good news 
and bad news disclosure in chairman statements. The approach is a 
subjective analysis that '…focuses on analysis of the underlying themes in 
the texts under investigation…' (Smith and Taffler, 2000:627).  
 
Hence, applying the manual content analysis involved counting the thematic 
contents for the meaning oriented. However, the reliability of the manual 
content analysis became a main concern. And because of the need for user's 
judgment in counting narratives and in determining conveyed messages, the 
following dimensions were applied to classify the contents characteristics 
(Smith and Taffler, 2000): 
 
a. Evaluative:   (positive/negative) and/or (beneficial/adverse). 
b. Potency:   (strong/weak) and/or (tangible/intangible). 
c. Activity:   (active/passive) and/or (dynamic/static). 
d. Manageability:  (expected/unexpected). 
 
The test excludes sentences and paragraphs that disclose any information 
about: board members welcome and goodbye, any staff changes review, and 
any congratulation for well done work.  
 
It is relevant to realise that some few disclosures are subjective and required 
user's judgment to determine messages conveyed. These few sentences are 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
considered as good and bad news disclosure in same time. As different 
users' groups, such as: existed investors, potential investors, agencies, 
clients and customers might find it good news disclosure while others might 
find it bad news. For instance, 
 
 '…there has been a sharp increase in capital market issuance and demand 
has been weak in the teeth of the recession. As a result we have not achieved 
our £16 billion net lending target. Even so, we are ready, willing and able 
to lend, and approved 85% of loan applications during 2009, a rate 
consistent with previous years.' (RBS Group Annual Report, 2009:3). 
 
The example is considered as good news disclosure because the bank was 
ready, willing and able to lend. However, it is also considered as bad news 
because the recession prevents the bank from achieving the targeted 
lending. 
 
Following Breton and Taffler (2001), Table 2 summarizes the themes' 
groups. This table shows the classification of the dimensions of the manual 
content analysis. Some real examples from chairman statements are as 
follows: 
 
The following example discusses the economy conditions as follows: 
'we believe that we are well positioned to benefit from the encouraging signs 
of economic recovery, albeit we believe the UK economy will grow at below 
trend levels over the next few years…' (Lloyds Banking Group Annual 
Report, 2009:7( 
 
The second example discusses the impact of financial crisis as follows: 
'2009 has been another difficult year for a number of the major economies 
in the world and this has continued to impact not just the banking industry, 
but also our customers and our clients.' (Barclays PLC Annual Report, 
2009:7) 
 
In the following examples, financial companies discussed issues related to 
profitability, growth and the strategic plan as follows: 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
'Earnings per share improved strongly, rising by 115 per cent to reach 
US$0.73 per share.' (HSBC Holdings plc. annual report, 2010:4)  
 
'I can report that Standard Chartered delivered another year of good 
income and profit growth in 2008…' (Standard Chartered plc annual report, 
2008:6) 
 
'In this difficult environment, we missed our profitability targets.' (HSBC 
Holdings plc. annual report, 2008:9) 
 
'To achieve its objectives, the company needs to change not just the business 
we do but how we do business.' (RBS Group annual report, 2008:3) 
 
Table 2 shows the classification of the dimensions of the manual content 
analysis. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
 
Reliability and Validity: 
The reliability of the manual content analysis is an essential consideration 
in all types of researches. This current research uses stability and 
reproducibility for assessing the reliability of the used content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004). 
 
Stability can be achieved by coding the same chairman statement more than 
once by the researcher. Therefore, the chairman statement of Barclays plc. 
2010 is coded and recoded for this purpose and results show stability. 
 
Reproducibility is another type of reliability assessments. Reproducibility 
recodes the same chairman statement by more than one researcher to 
measure the reliability of different researchers' understanding. A random 
sample of chairman statements was coded by the first and second authors 
independently.  The correlation between the disclosure scores produced by 
the first author and the second author was quite high (95%) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
In terms of the validity of our disclosure scores, we follow Botosan (1997)’s 
measure of validity by looking at [1] correlations between components of 
disclosure; [2] correlations between disclosure and some determinants of 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
disclosure as suggested by prior literature. We find that there is a positive 
and statistically significant association between our scores for good news 
information and bad news information. As reported in Table 4, the 
correlation between the two classes of information is 18.6% significant at 
the 5% level. Additionally, each class of information is highly correlated 
with the bad news-to-good news ratio (correlation between 29.6-55.1%, 
significant at the 1% level). Finally, as reported in prior research, our 
disclosure measure is correlated with leverage (the correlation is 17.2%, 
significant at the 10% level) and board size (the correlation is 21.9%, 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
The Model 
Many prior research suggested the use of ordinary least square (OLS) to 
examine the determinants of corporate disclosures (e.g. Aljifri and 
Hussainey, 2007; Francis et al., 2008; Smith and Taffler, 2000; Adams, 
2012; Erkens et al., 2012). This research uses the following OLS models: 
 
Good 
News 
Disclosure 
= a + b1 (CRISIS) + b2 (SIZE) + b3 (ROE) + b4 (LEV) + 
b5 (GROWTH) + b6 (DIV) + b7 (AUDIT) + b8 (BOARD) 
+ b9 (COMPOSITION) + b10 (INDUSTRY) + e. 
 
Bad News 
Disclosure 
= a + b1 (CRISIS) + b2 (SIZE) + b3 (ROE) + b4 (LEV) + 
b5 (GROWTH) + b6 (DIV) + b7 (AUDIT) + b8 (BOARD) 
+ b9 (COMPOSITION) + b10 (INDUSTRY) + e. 
 
Bad to 
Good 
News 
Disclosure 
= a + b1 (CRISIS) + b2 (SIZE) + b3 (ROE) + b4 (LEV) + 
b5 (GROWTH) + b6 (DIV) + b7 (AUDIT) + b8 (BOARD) 
+ b9 (COMPOSITION) + b10 (INDUSTRY) + e. 
 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that, on average 
11 sentences in the chairman statements contain good news information 
with a minimum of 1 statement and a maximum of 36 statements. On the 
other hand, on average about 5 sentences in the chairman statements contain 
bad news information with a minimum of zero statements and a maximum 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
of 28 statements. On average, the firm size (SIZE) is about 299,047.2 
million, with a minimum of 78.3 million and a maximum of 2,394,570 
million. Profitability ratio varies between companies with a maximum ROE 
of 85.99 and minimum ROE of -77.63. The average ROE is 15.78. The 
average leverage (LEV) ratio is 15.42, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum 
of 57.08. The average growth rate is 2.76 with a maximum value of 23.73. 
The average dividends per share is .18, with a minimum of zero dividend 
payments and a maximum of .80 dividend payments.  Minimum board size 
in our sample is 5 members, while the maximum board size is 22 members. 
The average board size is 12 members. The board composition varies 
between a minimum of 40% non-executive directors and a maximum of 
89%, comparing to the average composition ratio which is 66.23%.  
 
Table 3 - panels B present categorical variables, the frequency results show 
that 60% of the sample chairman statements are published during and after 
the crisis, while 40% of the sample is before the crisis. Finally, the financial 
statements of our selected sample firms are audited by one of the big four 
audit firms. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
 
Correlation Analysis  
Table 4 shows the correlation analysis. As discussed previously, our good 
news and bad news disclosure scores are positively correlated. Both classes 
of information are also correlated with the bad-to good news ratio. The table 
also shows that there is no serious multicollinearity problem between 
independent variables as the correlations between these variables are less 
than 70%. 
 
The VIF results reported in Tables 5, 6 and 7 show that all independent 
variables are smaller than 4, results support that there are no 
multicolinearity between the independent variables (Akhtaruddin et al., 
2009). 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Empirical Findings 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
The first regression shows that there is an inversely association between the 
good news disclosure and the crisis which is significantly different from 
zero, and results suggest not to reject the main hypothesis. The second 
regression analysis shows that bad news disclosure in chairman statements 
is positively associated with the crisis. The third regression results show 
that, the crisis is significant explanatory variable with positive association, 
which suggest not rejecting the crisis main hypothesis. 
 
Table 5 shows the findings for the first regression model which, proposes 
that good news disclosure in chairman statement is the only explained 
variable. While the control variable (industry type) is excluded in panel A, 
it is included in panel B. The CRISIS dummy variable is our variable of 
interest. The dummy variable AUDIT is omitted as the entire sample has 
assigned the big four audit firms. 
 
Panels A and B show that the crisis variable is significantly different from 
zero which suggest not to reject the main hypothesis; results also show that 
there are an inversely association between the good news disclosure and the 
crisis. The crisis variable results are consistent with prior research (e.g. 
Schleicher and Walker, 2010; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003); as there is 
association between good news disclosure in chairman statements and the 
crisis impacts. The findings for firm size are consistent with prior researches 
and the agency theory (Kang and Gray, 2011) as smaller firms rely on 
chairman statements more than bigger firms which uses other channels for 
good news disclosure. The dividends variable results are consistent with 
prior research (e.g. Hussainey and Aal-Eisa, 2009) as firms that faced a 
decline in their dividends during the crisis, might increase the level of 
disclosure based on disclosure signaling theory. The board size variable 
results are consistent with prior studies (e.g. Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008), 
and are in line with agency theory. Also, the board composition results are 
consistent with prior studies (e.g. Erkens et al., 2012) and they are in line 
with the stakeholder theory. 
 
The profitability variable results are inconsistent with both prior research 
and agency theory; this could be logic as management might rely in these 
crisis extraordinary circumstances on management impression techniques 
and other channels to disclose their good news information (such as the 
increase in profits). The leverage variable results are consistent with some 
prior studies (e.g. Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007), but inconsistent with others. 
The growth ratio variable results are inconsistent with prior studies (e.g. 
Kang and Gray, 2011), which suggest the high growth companies might use 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
more timely disclosure channels during the crisis period to signal their 
performance. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
The second regression analysis considers bad news disclosure as the only 
explained variable, results are presented in table 6. 
 
In the table, we note that the crisis variable is significantly different from 
zero. Therefore, bad news disclosure in chairman statements is positively 
associated with the crisis. Therefore, in the case of bad news disclosure, 
chairman statements positively increased the bad news narratives because 
of the crisis. These results are consistent with Clatworthy and Jones (2003) 
indicating that companies blame the external environment for any bad news. 
The chairman of the RBS plc., for example, states that: 'Our disappointing 
financial results reflect these circumstances and our exposure to them…' 
(RBS Group Annual Report, 2009:2) and 'In recognition of the crisis in 
global financial services and the unprecedented losses incurred by the RBS 
Group in 2008…' (RBS Group Annual Report, 2009:3). As reported in 
Table 5, we find a relationship between bad news disclosure in chairman 
statements and the financial crisis. We also find, firms that faced decline in 
their dividends during the crisis, might increase the level of disclosure in 
accordance with disclosure signaling theory (Hussainey and Aal-Eisa, 
2009). However, companies' managements prefer not to disclose bad news 
in chairman statement if these narratives have negatively effects. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
Table 7 presents the last regression analysis results considering the bad 
news to good news disclosure percentage as a dependent variable. 
 
Both results in panels A and B confirm that, the crisis is significant 
explanatory variable with positive association. Hence, our results suggest 
not rejecting the crisis main hypothesis, which is supported by Clatworthy 
and Jones (2003) that external environment are being blamed for any bad 
news. This third regression analysis is considered as a sensitivity analysis, 
as results confirmed the second regression. The crisis variable results are 
consistent with prior researches (e.g. Schleicher and Walker, 2010; 
Clatworthy and Jones, 2003); these results confirm the consistency of the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
crisis variable with bad news disclosure in accordance with signalling 
theory. Also, all other variables results are insignificant confirming the fact 
that managements do not use chairman statements to disclose bad figures. 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
Discussion 
Our paper examines incentives for good/bad news disclosure in chairman 
statements during the crisis. Results show an association between the crisis 
and good/bad news disclosure in chairman statements. The first regression 
shows an inverse association between the crisis and good news narratives 
in chairman statements. The second and the third regressions show a 
positive association between the crisis and bad news narratives in chairman 
statements. All these results suggest that risky and poor performing 
financial institutions provide more negative tone during the crisis, which is 
consistent with Schleicher and Walker (2010) findings. 
Also results show that, firms' managements prefer to blame the crisis, as an 
external extraordinary environment, for any bad news (Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2003). For example: In the HSBC annual report it is argued that: 
 
'2008 was the most extraordinary year for the global economy and financial 
services in well over half a century. It marked the first crisis of the era of 
globalised securitisation…' (HSBC Group plc. annual Report and accounts, 
2008:8). 
 
Further examples support our findings as follows: In the 2007 RBS plc. 
chairman statement, it is stated that:  
 
'RBS enjoyed another successful year in 2007…despite some of the most 
challenging market conditions in the financial and credit markets for some 
time. The hard work of our employees allowed us to deliver a strong 
financial and operational performance…'. (RBS plc. annual reports and 
accounts, 2007:8) 
 
In the following year, we noted in the 2008 RBS Plc’s chairman statement 
that the chairman argued:  
 
'…an exceptionally difficult period in the history of The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group… Our disappointing financial results reflect these 
circumstances and our exposure to them… In recognition of the crisis in 
global financial services and the unprecedented losses incurred by the RBS 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Group in 2008… We recognise that our reputation has been damaged by 
the events of the last year'. (RBS plc. annual report and accounts, 2008:2). 
 
 
So what if the crisis influences the good/bad news disclosure in the popular 
chairman statement? This would suggest that as chairman statements are 
unaudited and firms could lie, managements would benefit from using 
impression management techniques. For instance, it is stated that: 
 
'We at HSBC were not immune from the crisis. But we have built our 
business on very strong foundations and are able to report results which 
demonstrate our ability to withstand the storm' (HSBC Group plc. annual 
report and accounts, 2008:8). 
 
Also, the crisis might motivate corporate management to overly blame the 
external environments in order to distort users’ perceptions towards 
management actual performance; particularly, these risky and poor 
performing financial institutions that provided a more negative tone during 
the crisis. For example, it is stated in one of the chairman statements that: 
 
'… Our combination of clear strategic goals and a commitment to 
continuous operational improvement positions us well in a changing 
environment…we believe our business is robust, capable of generating 
sustained profitable growth and value, and increasingly well positioned 
competitively for the future'. (Legal & General Group plc. annual report and 
accounts, 2007:5).  
 
However, Legal and General Group plc. reported in the next year statement 
that: 
 
'The credit crisis and its consequences … It has had a heavy impact on our 
share price and on your returns… Total Shareholder Return (TSR) for 2008 
was negative 38% (2007: negative 14%). This reflects a fall of 31% in the 
FTSE All-Share Index and a decline of 40% for the life insurance sector 
during the year'. (Legal & General Group plc. annual report and accounts, 
2008:4). 
 
It also worth noting that, many of good performing firms would emphasise 
their management performance by referring to their ability to perform well 
while working in a difficult financial environment using chairman 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
statements, which could be considered as cheap talk. For example, British 
Land plc. stated that: 
 
'What a difference a year makes! A year ago, real estate markets were close 
to all-time highs…Today, doom and gloom is widespread and fears of the 
impact of the global ‘credit crunch’ are not yet receding…While it is true 
that the current down-cycle has been unusually fast and severe in its 
effects… It’s a time for cool heads, long-term clarity, a robust business 
model and ‘business as usual’ for our management team' (British Land plc. 
annual report and accounts, 2008:6) 
 
 In the following year, British Land plc. stated that: 
'…we have felt the impact of a global recession…In the year to March 2009 
our portfolio declined 28% in value. Taking the Rights Issue into account, 
this valuation reduction took our net asset value down from 1114 pence to 
398 pence per share'. (British Land PLC Annual Report and accounts, 
2009:6). 
 
On contrary, large firms use alternative channels to communicate with 
financial reports users. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines the impact of financial crisis on corporate disclosure 
of good and bad news narratives in chairman statements. By analysing the 
contents of 110 UK chairman statements to identify levels of good and bad 
news information. For the period that covers 5 years (2006-2010). 
 
The study results suggest that the crisis is considered as significant incentive 
for good/bad news disclosure in chairman statement. The crisis is associated 
inversely with good news disclosure in chairman statement. A possible 
explanation is that financial institutions disclosed good news using other 
reporting channels than chairman statements. While the crisis is positively 
associated with bad news disclosure, as there is an increase in bad news 
narratives in the sample chairman statements. In addition, results show that 
risky and poor performing financial institutions in the sample provided a 
more negative tone during the crisis. 
 
The results of good and bad news disclosure in chairman statement 
attributable to the crisis are reasonably justified on the grounds that many 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
accounting narratives in the sample blamed and declared the impact of the 
crisis. For instance: (HSBC Holdings plc. annual report, 2008:8) in 
chairman statement section stated that '2008 was the most extraordinary 
year for the global economy and financial services in well over half a 
century. It marked the first crisis of the era of globalised securitisation'. It is 
possible that, some chairman statements increased bad news accounting 
narratives blaming the crisis as external environmental factor for any bad 
financial performance. Moreover, findings also suggest that management 
emphasised their managerial performance by disclosing good/bad news 
narratives in the chairman statement, by referring to their ability to perform 
well while working in a difficult financial environment, such as the crisis; 
possibly using impression management techniques. 
 
What if any of the users of annual reports relies on chairman statement for 
taking investing or financing decisions during the crisis? We are afraid that 
users might be misled; such as relating bad performance to the crisis not to 
company's management. This leads to taking wrong decisions that cost 
users big losses. Moreover, this highlight on the usefulness of relying on 
accounting narratives in chairman statement when taking decisions under 
the impact of extraordinary crisis, which could affects whether the good/bad 
news narratives reflect or do not reflect fairly and reliably the truth about 
the financial position of firms and their management performance.  
 
What is the impact upon society? Evidences of any influence of the crisis 
on good/bad news narratives in chairman statement will help users to 
carefully consider our paper findings when using chairman statement during 
extraordinary crisis for taking decisions. Also, these evidences would 
encourage and enhance managements, auditors and other parties to disclose 
and monitor the chairman's narratives in annual reports carefully. Then the 
more reliable chairman statements, the better improvement in the usefulness 
of accounting narratives and information, which leads to better ability to 
take good decisions, and avoid losses as a result of misleading narratives. 
Consequently, the society will benefit from better business environment. In 
conclusion, reliable information is power. 
 
These findings are prominently interesting for the users of chairman 
statements, and other members in the society, as these statements are 
considered as a popular source of information for annual reports users. The 
paper findings highlight on the usefulness of issues using accounting 
narratives in chairman statement during extraordinary business 
environment, such as the crisis. The research findings open up another 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
potentially interesting point for research. Given that these extraordinary 
circumstances might motivate corporate management to overly blame the 
external environments in order to distort users’ perceptions towards 
management actual performance. In turn, analysis of impression 
management techniques within the chairman statement would reveal 
interesting insights that benefit managements, not users or the society; 
which is an issue that might be considered as a fruitful research topic for 
further studies in the future that find out how to prevent misusing good/bad 
news narratives in chairman statements to improve their reliability 
 
There are still some limitations in this research. Firstly, the use of manual 
content analysis for collecting good/bad news narratives in chairman 
statement is possibly subjective. So it is recommended to apply a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies for measuring the good/bad 
news disclosure in chairman statements, such as: manual and computerized 
content analysis, surveys, interviews and multiple OLS regression analyses.
 Secondly, the sample included only 110 chairman statements from 
the FTSE 100; hence results might not be generalized. In the future, a cross-
country large sample drawn from countries heavily exposed to the crisis. A 
sample of more than 250 firms would be chosen from about 25 countries, 
which were at the center of the crisis, including UK and European 
Countries. That sample could ensure more reliable and generalizable 
outcomes (i.e. the larger the sample, the better reliable results). Finally, to 
identify disclosure scores for good and bad news information for a large 
sample of companies over longer time periods, we suggest that researchers 
should consider using computer-based content analysis (i,e, NVivo 
Software) to count the number of good and bad news sentences, This 
requires the creation of a reliable keyword lists that covers both good news 
and bad news information. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the used explanatory variables. 
Variable Measurement Source 
Crisis CRISIS 1=If year 2008, 2009, 
2010; 0=If year 2006, 
2007. 
- 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Classification of the dimensions of the manual content analysis 
The 
Dimension 
Of Content 
Analysis 
Good News Disclosure Bad News Disclosure 
Market 
Conditions 
& 
Expectations 
- Increase in markets 
activities. 
- Stable or active 
economy. 
- Positive fundamentals. 
- Future positive 
expectations in the 
market. 
- Decrease in markets 
activities. 
- Unstable or inactive 
economy. 
- Not positive fundamentals. 
- Future negative, uncertainty 
or gloomy expectations in 
the market. 
Impact of 
the Crisis 
- Not effected by the 
crisis. 
- Even though the crisis, 
achieved good results. 
- Effected by the crisis. 
- Because of the crisis, 
achieved bad & negative 
results. 
Firm Size 
Profitability 
Leverage 
Growth 
Dividends 
SIZE 
ROE 
LEV 
GROWTH 
DIV 
Log total assets. 
ROE, the return on 
equity ratio. 
Debt to total assets. 
Price-to-book value 
ratio (PBR). 
Dividend per share. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Auditor 
reputation 
Board Size 
Composition 
AUDIT 
 
BOARD 
COMPOSITION 
1=If auditor is Big4; 
0=If not. 
 
The total members of 
the Board. 
Non-Executive 
managers to the Board 
percentage. 
Annual 
Reports 
Industry 
type 
INDUSTRY IT1 to IT5 for 
representing the 
sectors under FTSE 
100. 
Londonstock-
exchange.com 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Profitability - Increase in profitability 
figures. 
- Achieving or exceeding 
the targeted 
profitability. 
- Positive results, returns, 
profits and earnings. 
- Decrease in profitability 
figures. 
- Increase in profitability 
figures, but not achieving the 
target. 
- Losses, costs and negative 
results. 
Growth - Growth achievements in 
several activities. 
- Additions, 
developments, 
acquisitions and 
investments. 
- Non growth in several 
activities. 
- Negative figures for 
activities. 
- Disposals. 
 
Financial 
Position 
- Strong financial 
position. 
- Stable financial position. 
- Better gearing, capital, 
liquidity and dividends. 
 
- Weak financial position. 
- Unstable financial position. 
- Financial support was 
needed. 
- Not good positions as per: 
gearing, capital, liquidity and 
dividends. 
Strategic 
Disclosure 
- Acquisitions future 
plans that lead to 
growths. 
- Managements, 
Productivity, 
Competitive Innovative 
and developments 
plans. 
- Any other positive 
strategic disclosures. 
- Recovery and Restructures 
plans. 
- Not achieving planned 
Acquisitions or expanding 
plans and projects. 
- Cancellation of planned 
projects because of an 
outsider forces.   
 
Note:  Sentences or paragraphs in the chairman statement that disclose 
the following are excluded: 
1. New board members welcome and goodbye. 
2. Staff changes review. 
3. Congratulation for work well done. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel (A) Continuous Variables 
Variable Mean Min Max 
GOOD NEWS 11.49 1 36 
BAD NEWS 5.27 0 28 
SIZE* 299,047.2 78.3 2,394,570 
ROE 15.7814 -77.63 85.99 
LEV 15.4152 0 57.08 
GROWTH 2.7585 .33 23.73 
DIV .1762 0 .80 
BOARD 11.78 5 22 
COMPOSITION .6623 .40 .89 
Panel (B) Categorical Variables (Frequency) 
Variable Number  Number 
CRISIS 66 after the crisis  44 before the crisis 
AUDIT 110 Big4  0 Non Big4 
Firm size (total assets) in million. The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Correlation analysis 
 
 Good 
News  
Bad 
News  
Bad-
to-
Good 
News 
Size ROE LEV RB DIV Board  Compo-
-sition 
Good News  1             
Bad News  .186 
.056 
1            
Bad-to-Good -
.296** 
.002 
.551** 
.000 
1           
SIZE -.141 
.150 
.169 
.084 
.170 
.081 
1          
ROE .009 
.924 
-
.475** 
.000 
-
.367** 
.000 
-
.403** 
.000 
1         
LEV .172 
.083 
.283** 
.004 
.032 
.748 
.194* 
.046 
-
.488** 
.000 
1        
GROWTH -.043 
.664 
-
.279** 
.004 
-.247* 
.011 
-
.592** 
.000 
.618** 
.000 
-
.397** 
.000 
1       
DIV .060 
.544 
-.107 
.277 
-.097 
.324 
-.088 
.359 
.060 
.533 
.020 
.834 
.112 
.248 
1      
BOARD .219* 
.024 
.184 
.059 
-.009 
.924 
.688** 
.000 
-.238* 
.014 
.363** 
.000 
-
.408** 
.000 
.216* 
.025 
1     
COMPOSITION .070 
.478 
.171 
.079 
.246* 
.011 
.341** 
.000 
-.164 
.091 
.041 
.675 
-
.272** 
.004 
.079 
.417 
.303** 
.001 
1    
* indicates that the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
** indicates that the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Good news disclosure regression analysis 
 
Variable 
Panel A. Good News  
without Industry Type 
Panel B. Good News  
with Industry Type 
B Sig VIF B Sig 
Constant 13.285 .016 - 6.229 .440 
CRISIS -3.579 .004 1.178 -3.262 .005 
SIZE -4.491 .000 3.041 -2.673 .057 
ROE -.010 .720 1.976 -.031 .278 
LEV -.001 .973 1.626 -.110 .312 
GROWTH -.290 .173 2.261 -.250 .270 
DIV -8.735 .049 1.339 -12.056 .008 
BOARD 1.323 .000 2.816 1.558 .000 
COMPOSITION 12.052 .094 1.195 13.698 .055 
INDUSTRY 
TYPE 
No Yes 
 R2                           .330 R2                          .461 
Adjusted R2          .273 Adjusted R2         .388 
F Value                5.736       F Value               6.345       
Observation           110 Observation          110 
The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Bad news disclosure regression analysis 
 
Variable 
Panel A. Bad News without  
Industry Type 
Panel B. Bad News 
with 
 Industry Type 
B Sig VIF B Sig 
Constant 4.915 .263 - 11.912 .091 
CRISIS 2.556 .011 1.178 2.405 .017 
SIZE -.717 .308 3.041 -1.740 .151 
ROE -.084 .000 1.976 -.105 .000 
LEV .017 .631 1.626 -.061 .516 
GROWTH .006 .974 2.261 -.147 .456 
DIV -5.847 .103 1.339 -6.647 .088 
BOARD .182 .478 2.816 .199 .444 
COMPOSITION 2.666 .644 1.195 .726 .906 
INDUSTRY 
TYPE 
No Yes 
 R2                         .328 R2                         .376 
Adjusted R2        .271  Adjusted R2        .292 
F Value              5.686       F Value              4.474       
Observation         110 Observation         110 
The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
        
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Bad news to good news disclosure percentage regression analysis 
results 
 
Variable 
Panel A. Bad to Good News 
without Industry Type 
Panel B. Bad to Good 
News 
with Industry Type 
B Sig VIF B Sig 
Constant -.064 .925 - 1.072 .331 
CRISIS .427 .007 1.178 .397 .013 
SIZE .073 .503 3.041 -.161 .398 
ROE -.009 .016 1.976 -.010 .011 
LEV -.005 .333 1.626 -.016 .277 
GROWTH -.009 .724 2.261 -.024 .434 
DIV -.152 .783 1.339 -.140 .818 
BOARD -.043 .277 2.816 -.059 .151 
COMPOSITION 1.248 .165 1.195 1.145 .238 
INDUSTRY 
TYPE 
No Yes 
 
R2                        .280 R2                          .311 
Adjusted R2       .218   Adjusted R2         .218 
F Value             4.510 F Value               3.351 
Observation        110 Observation          110 
The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1. 
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